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1. Introduction. 
 
A combination of targets and policies in the climate and energy policy realm has been 
adopted in the European Union (EU) for both 2020 and 2030. The 2020 package sets 
three key targets: a 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (from 1990 levels), 
20% of EU energy from renewable energy sources (RES) and a 20% improvement in 
energy efficiency. For 2030, these targets include a 40% cut in greenhouse gas 
emissions compared to 1990 levels, a 27% share of renewable energy consumption and 
27% energy savings compared to the business-as-usual scenario. In this context, the EU 
and its Member States (MS) have been and are committed to the deployment of 
electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E). In recent years, the share of 
electricity generation from renewables in the EU has quickly grown from around 14.8% 
in 2005 to 25.4% in 2013 (Eurostat 2015), largely due to rapid increases in wind and 
solar investments. Arguably, the targets in the RES-E Directive for 2010 and the RES 
Directive for 2020 as well as MS promotion schemes for RES-E deployment have 
leveraged significant growth in renewables.  
On the other hand, the large and recent increase of RES-E penetration in the EU has 
raised the concern of EU and MS policy makers about the costs of RES-E promotion, 
which has increased considerably in the last years, particularly for wind energy and 
solar PV. Total wind energy support costs increased almost three-fold between 2009 
and 2013 (from 4883 M€ to 12447M€) and solar PV increased almost four-fold (from 
5855 M€ to 23128 M€) (Ortega and del Río 2016, based on data from the Council of 
European Energy Regulators, CEER). The costs of RES-E support are passed to 
electricity consumers in their bills and they are often regarded as a main driver of the 
increase of retail electricity prices, triggering an EU-wide discussion on the need to 
limit those costs. On the one hand, governments in EU MS have implemented cost-
containment measures, i.e., design elements which have reduced the overall costs of 
support in existing RES-E support schemes (Mir-Artigues and del Río 2014, del Río 
and Mir-Artigues 2014). On the other hand, the European Commission has stressed the 
need to have cost-effective and market-based instruments, suggesting that the 
predominant RES-E support instrument (feed-in tariffs (FITs)) have been too expensive 
and not suitable to integrate an increasing volume of RES-E in electricity markets 
(European Commission 2013, 2014a, 2014b). 
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The concern about higher retail electricity prices which have been triggered by RES-E 
support costs is related to the relevance of electricity as an input factor in the production 
and consumption decisions of households and firms in all production sectors. The 
impact of energy regulations on the electricity prices may result in less money being 
available in the pockets of households’ breadwinners for other consumption 
alternatives. This consumer surplus loss is obviously negative for the welfare of 
households. On the other hand, the negative impact of higher electricity prices on the 
competitiveness of firms is currently a major source of concern in the EU Member 
States, where the importance of a strong economy and industry is often stressed 
(European Commission 2015).  
Despite the relevance of the issue, research on the relative impact of the different 
components of the retail electricity prices (whether regulatory or non-regulatory ones) 
and, particularly, on the comparative effect of RES-E support with respect to other 
components, has been rather scarce (see next section for a literature review). To the best 
of our knowledge, the few contributions have generally focused on a single country and 
some of them are rather descriptive. Furthermore, the use of econometric models as a 
methodological tool to identify the relation between the relevant variables has been 
virtually absent. The aim of this paper is to cover this gap in the literature. An empirical 
analysis of the degree of influence of RES-E support costs on the retail price of 
electricity (for households as well as for industry) in 22 EU countries is provided.  
Accordingly, this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the analytical 
framework as well as the links to the existing literature. Section 3 discusses the 
methodology. The results of the empirical analysis are provided in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Analytical framework and links to the existing literature. 
The analysis of the impact of RES-E support on retail electricity prices can be placed in 
the context of the regulatory analysis of the electricity sector. Among the various 
economic activities, electricity is characterised for being one of the most highly 
regulated sectors. Indeed, the regulatory changes affecting the electricity sector have 
been especially intense in the EU in the last two decades and have had an enormous 
impact on the structure of the sector and its business agents, as well as on the 
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functioning of the electricity market itself. 
Evaluating the economic impact of the regulations of the electricity sector and the 
changes in these regulations is a complex task. The assessment and measurement of the 
impact of the reform processes and regulatory changes have been analysed in the 
relevant literature with different approaches, including a macroeconomic approach 
focusing on the analysis of regulatory policies and their impact within the framework of 
general equilibrium theory (Chisari et al., 1999) and a quantitative evaluation of a 
country’s regulatory framework. We follow the so-called performance-metrics approach 
in this paper, which has been widely used in academic studies for evaluating the impact 
of regulatory changes based on the results obtained in terms of pricing, investment, 
accessibility, service quality or the evolution in greenhouse gases emissions, among 
others (Cubbin and Stern, 2006; Pollitt, 2009). 
Several regulatory variables can be considered as key drivers of retail electricity prices, 
including the promotion costs related to RES-E support, network costs, taxes and levies. 
Therefore, although the focus of this paper is on the first one, the others are taken into 
account in the econometric analysis as control variables. 
There is an abundant literature on the analysis of the impact of higher levels of RES-E 
generation (usually triggered by RES-E support schemes) on electricity prices. The 
literature on the so-called merit-order effect has focused on the impact of such 
generation on wholesale electricity prices, leading to the general conclusion that it 
results in a reduction on those prices (see Sáenz de Miera et al 2008, Gelabert et al 
2015, Wurzburg et al 2013, Senssus et al 2008, Fischer 2009, among many others). 
Since RES-E generation is generally supported with an add-on on the wholesale price 
paid by electricity consumers in their bills, the issue is whether the lower wholesale 
price is partially or totally offset by the RES-E support, leading to an increase or 
reduction in the retail prices. The literature has been inconclusive in this regard, with 
some contributions showing an increase in retail prices (EIA 2003, Traber and Kemfert 
2009) and others a reduction (Tellus Institute 2002, UCS 2004, Sáenz de Miera et al 
2008, Rathmann 2007). Assumptions about the slopes of the supply of renewable and 
non-renewable energy play a crucial role in explaining the different results across 
studies (Fischer 2009).  
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However, this paper adopts a different approach. The analysis focuses on the relative 
influence of RES-E support on retail prices with respect to other components of those 
prices. Therefore, the literature reviewed has focused on the impact of the costs of RES-
E promotion, taxes, levies and network costs on retail electricity prices. Several sources 
of information have been consulted, including the most relevant energy journals 
(Energy Economics, Electricity Journal, Energy Policy, Energy Journal, Energy, 
Applied Energy and Environmental Economics and Energy Policy), and publications 
from relevant institutions (the European Commission, CEER, ACER). Furthermore, a 
general google search has been carried out. Key words have been introduced in the 
internal search engine for the journals and in google (retail prices, regulated costs, 
network costs, distribution costs, transmission costs, RES policy support costs). 
Detailed results of the review are provided in Annex I. 
The review leads to the general conclusion that the comparative influence of the 
different components of the retail price and, in particular, RES-E support, has received 
scant attention in the literature.  The paper contributes to the existing literature on 
several fronts. Our analysis considers several relevant regulatory and non-regulatory 
drivers of retail electricity prices. The time and geographical coverage is relatively wide 
(22 of the 28 EU Member States over the 2007-2013 period).  The empirical application 
is based on the estimation of an econometric model with panel data, in contrast to the 
descriptive approaches and the approach based on electricity market models used in part 
of the literature. Finally, the impact of different types of RES-E support schemes on 
those prices is analysed. 
The focus on RES-E support in this paper is justified given the relevance attached in 
policy and academic circles to this component as a main driver of retail prices (see, e.g., 
CEER 2011, 2013, 2015, European Commission 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, Frondel et 
al 2010).  
In the EU, RES-E support has been provided with several primary instruments. The 
term “primary” refers to instruments which are the basis (the main economic incentive) 
for RES-E support in a specific country (del Río and Mir-Artigues 2014). In general, 
four main categories of primary support schemes have been applied in the EU MS (see 
del Río and Mir-Artigues 2014, Held et al 2014). They can be broadly classified into 
price-based and quantity-based instruments: 
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Price-based support schemes: 
 Feed-in tariffs (FITs) guarantee a fixed price per kWh of electricity. 
 Feed-in premiums (FIPs) are paid on top of the market price of 
electricity. 
Quantity-based support schemes: 
 Quotas with tradable green certificates (TGCs). Under this scheme, 
certificates are issued for every MWh of RES-E, allowing generators to 
obtain additional revenue to the sale of electricity. Demand for TGCs 
originates from an obligation on electricity distributors to surrender a 
number of TGCs as a share of their annual consumption (quota).  
 In auctions, developers compete for supply contracts to build RES-E 
capacity. They have recently been combined with FITs and FIPs in the 
EU, being used to set the remuneration level under these instruments 
(AURES project 2016). 
Those primary instruments have been complemented with other “secondary 
instruments”, which include tax exemptions (TE), investment incentives (II), financial 
incentives (FI) and net metering (NM). In contrast to the primary instruments, which 
generally cover all RES-E installations and are set at the national level, secondary 
instruments are usually limited in scope and circumscribed to specific types of projects 
(e.g., small ones) and technologies (e.g., solar PV). Secondary ones are applied at both 
the national and lower government levels, that is, regional/provincial/municipal (del Río 
and Mir-Artigues 2014). 
Regarding the primary instruments, RES support in the EU has mostly been based on 
FITs (table 1). FIPs and quotas with TGCs have been used to a much lesser extent and 
auctions have virtually been non-existent until very recently. It should be mentioned 
that those support schemes have experienced small changes in the first part of the period 
(2007-2010), mostly related to adaptations in existing schemes, e.g., modifications of 
design elements (see Held et al 2014). However, significant changes can be observed in 
more recent times (i.e., since 2011), mostly away from FITs and towards FIPSs and 
auctioning schemes (AURES project 2016). This is probably related to the concern of 
MS governments on the low “market compatibility” and the relatively high total support 
costs of FITs and the fact that after the EU Commission Guidelines on Energy and 
Environmental Protection Aid 2014-2020, as auctions for RES will be implemented in 
6
  
the EU from 2017 onwards. Several countries have recently implemented cost-
containment mechanisms in price-based support schemes (FITs and FIPs), such as 
flexible degression and capacity and generation caps. 
Table 1. Instruments for RES-E deployment support in the EU (2013). 
 Primary instruments Secondary instruments 
MS Hydro Wind Bio PV Geo Hydro Wind Bio PV Geo 
AT  FIT FIT FIT(1); II(2) FIT      
BE QO QO QO QO QO 
TE; 
II(3) 
TE; II 
(3) 
TE; 
II(3) 
TE;II(4) TE 
BG FIT FIT FIT FIT; TN(5) FIT FI(6) FI(6) FI(6) FI(6) FI(6) 
CY  FIT FIT FIT   II II II  
CZ FIT/FIP FIT/FIP(7) FIT/FIP FIT/FIP(8)   II, FI    
DE FIT/FIP FIT/FIP FIT/FIP FIT/FIP FIT/FIP FI FI FI FI FI 
DK FIP FIP(9); TN(10) FIP FIP FIP II(11) II(11); FI II(11) 
II(11); 
NM; TE 
II(11) 
EE FIP FIP FIP FIP FIP TE II; TE TE TE TE 
EL FIT FIT FIT FIT FIT II; TE II; TE II; TE II; TE II; TE 
ES FIT/FIP(12) FIT/FIP(12) FIT/FIP(12) FIT/FIP(12) FIT/FIP(12) TE TE TE TE TE 
FI  FIP FIP   II II II II II 
FR FIT 
FIT(13); 
TN(14) 
FIT 
FIT(15); 
TN(16) 
FIT II II II II II 
HR           
HU FIT FIT FIT FIT FIT II II II II II 
IE FIT FIT FIT FIT FIT TE TE TE TE TE 
IT 
FIT
(17)
; 
FIP
(18)
; QO; 
TN
(20)
 
FIT
(17)
; 
FIP
(18)
; QO; 
TN
(20)
 
FIT
(17)
; 
FIP
(18)
; QO; 
TN
(20)
 
FIT
(17)
; 
NM
(19)
; QO; 
TN
(20)
 
FIT
(17)
; 
FIP
(18)
; QO; 
TN
(20)
 
TE TE TE TE TE 
LT 
FIT(21); 
FIT/TN(22) 
FIT(21); 
FIT/TN(22) 
FIT(21); 
FIT/TN(22) 
FIT(21); 
FIT/TN(22) 
 II, FI II, FI II, FI II, FI II, FI 
LU FIT FIT FIT FIT FIT II II II II II 
LV FIT FIT FIT FIT FIT II; TE II; TE II; TE II; TE II; TE 
MT    FIT   II(23); FI  
II(23); 
FI; TE 
 
NL FIP FIP FIP 
FIP(24); 
NM(25) 
FIP FI FI(26) FI FI;II FI 
PL QO QO QO QO QO 
FI; II; 
TE 
FI; II; 
TE 
FI; II; 
TE 
FI; II; 
TE 
FI; II; 
TE 
PT FIT; TN FIT; TN FIT; TN FIT; TN FIT; TN TE TE TE TE TE 
RO QO QO QO QO QO II II II II II 
SE QO QO QO QO QO  
TE; 
II(27) 
TE II  
SI FIT; FIP FIT; FIP FIT; FIP FIT; FIP FIT; FIP II; FI II; FI II; FI II; FI II; FI 
SK FIP FIP FIP FIP FIP II, TE II, TE II, TE II, TE II, TE 
UK QO; FIT(28) QO; FIT(28) QO; FIT(28) QO; FIT(28) QO; FIT(28) TE TE TE TE TE 
(1): Solar PV >5kW; (2): Solar PV ≤5kW; (3): Only in Brussels; (4): Only in Flanders; (5): Solar PV>100kW; (6): Only 
small scale projects; (7): Wind >20MW excluded; (8): Solar PV >30kW; (9): Wind Onshore; (10): Wind Offshore; (11): 
Small scale installations; (12): Existing plants before January, 2012; (13): Wind Onshore; (14): Wind Offshore; (15): Solar 
PV <100kW; (16): Solar PV >100kW;(17): Existing plants <1MW; (18): Existing plants >1MW and <1MW which do not 
choose the FIT; (19): Solar PV <20kW. It is alternative to FIT; (20): New plants – large projects; (21): <10kW; (22): 
>10kW; (23): Small scale projects <3.7kW; (24): Solar PV >15kW; (25): Solar PV <15kW; (26): Wind Offshore excluded; 
(27): Wind Offshore; (28): <5MW. 
FIT: Feed-in Tariff; FIP: Feed-in Premium; QO: Quota Obligations; TN: Tenders; II: Investment Incentive; FI: Financial 
Incentive; TE: Tax Exemption; NM: Net Metering. 
Source: CEER (2015), Mir-Artigues and del Río (2014) and European Commission (2015). 
Although the functioning of support schemes has been the focus of much research (see 
Mitchell et al 2011, Held et al 2014 for reviews), mostly taking into account the 
effectiveness and efficiency criteria, as well as their effects on the wholesale electricity 
price (the so-called merit order effect, see e.g. Sáenz de Miera et al 2008, Cludius et al 
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2014), the impact of those schemes on the retail electricity prices has not received a 
comparable attention. 
 
3. Methods. 
3.1. The model 
This section discusses the econometric method which is used to assess the impact of 
RES-E regulation on the retail price of electricity for both industrial consumers and 
households. Eq. (1) represents the reduced form of the price econometric model:  
𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3
′ 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡    (1) 
Where the different variables refer to: 
PEit Retail electricity price (dependent variable). 
PEit-1: Lagged retail electricity price 
Regit: Electricity regulation 
X’it: Set of variables which allow us to control for all other observable factors that 
affect the price  
𝜀1𝑖𝑡: Random error 
 
The sub-indices i and t refer to countries and years, respectively.    
The electricity prices are affected by several regulations, not only RPCs, and by other 
factors. All these variables are included as control variables since they are all expected 
to influence the evolution of retail prices. 
Regarding the regulatory variables, network costs and taxes and levies are included in 
our model. Network costs are defined as the ratio between the revenue related to 
transmission and distribution tariffs and the corresponding volume per consumption 
band. If complementary services like transmission and distribution losses, after-sale 
services, system service costs and meter rental are identified separately, then they are 
allocated to the network costs as an aggregated measure. Finally, taxes and levies are an 
additional, well-known component of electricity retail prices. They include the value 
added tax, excise taxes, nuclear decommissioning, support for vulnerable consumers, 
energy efficiency support, island system compensation, tariff deficit annuities, stranded 
costs and compensation fees, research funding, security of supply surcharges, 
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concession fees, offshore grid connection surcharges, coal decommissioning and 
pension funds, among others (Eurelectric, 2014). Therefore, it is crucial to include this 
component as an additional control variable, which is expected to positively affect retail 
prices. 
In addition, the following non-regulatory variables are included in the specification and 
estimation of the model: 
- Energy-only costs. A main component of final electricity prices, in addition to 
regulated costs, is the cost of electricity as such, i.e., the wholesale price of electricity in 
the intraday market plus adjustments. This variable, as calculated by Eurostat, also 
includes the retail margin. We can expect that, the higher the energy-only costs, the 
higher the prices of electricity will be. 
- Electricity consumption. The evolution of electricity prices depends on the interaction 
between supply and demand in each country. Following a hedonic specification of 
prices to analyse the influencing factors, the different country characteristics are 
collected in the parameters of the estimated coefficient in this model. Given that the 
quantity captures the size of the market, the sign of the estimated coefficient should be 
negative. 
-Lagged electricity prices. This has been included as an additional variable in the model 
in order to capture and control for the dynamic component of the behaviour of prices.   
 
Thus, the econometric specification of the equation (1), which will be estimated for both 
household and industrial consumers, can be expressed as follows: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡 (2) 
+𝛼5𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 
 
 
 
Where: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1: lagged dependent variable 
𝑅𝑃𝐶𝑖𝑡:  renewable energy promotion costs 
𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡:  network costs  
𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡:  energy-only costs,  
𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡:  taxes and levies,  
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡:      electricity consumption  
𝑇𝑡:  linear trend 
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The analysis is performed by discriminating according to the typology of consumers, 
given their different nature and power demand profile. Special attention is given to 
prices for households and industrial electricity consumers (DC and IC bands according 
to Eurostat classification, respectively), which are the most representative consumer 
bands. Thus, the above equation is estimated for, both, household and industrial 
electricity consumers in order to grasp the possible differential relevance of the 
determinants on those two types of consumers. 
The estimation method has taken the dynamic panel nature of the model into account 
(22 countries over the period 2007-2013). This is the period when RPCs experienced the 
greatest increase in several MS. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method would lead 
to biased coefficients due to the underlying endogeneity of the lagged dependent 
variable. In contrast, the GMM Arellano-Bond method for dynamic panel data is able to 
generate consistent estimators and has good small-sample properties which are quite 
convenient in our case. Therefore, this GMM method has been used in our estimation. 
 
3.2. The data 
The price data from Eurostat used in this work cover the years between 2007 and 2013, 
the first and the last full years with complete retail price data for all Member States. The 
new Eurostat methodology provides comparable data for all EU States and is published 
every six months (on a yearly basis by components). Separate component price data for 
energy, network and taxes are not available before 2007. Although final price data are 
available since 1990, the main advantage of this new methodology is that the real 
average prices that customers pay for their consumption are provided and a comparison 
of prices at national level as well as a comparison of the components of the prices can 
be undertaken. This is due to the fact that the new methodology provides disaggregated 
data for the energy-only costs, network costs and taxes and levies. 
 
Unlike the other variables used in this analysis, the information on renewable electricity 
support costs is not directly available in a standardized public or private database. In 
order to overcome this data limitation, we have built the Renewable Promotion Cost 
(RPC) variable based on the information provided by the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER 2011, 2013, 2015). First, the total expenditures on RES-E promotion 
were calculated as the product of the RES-E weighted average support level by 
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technology (from CEER reports) multiplied by the overall RES-E production for that 
technology. Then, the promotion costs for all the technologies were added and the 
Renewable Promotion Cost (RPC) was calculated as the ratio between the total 
expenditure on RES-E promotion and the total electricity consumption. Therefore, the 
resulting variable is measured in €/MWh. This variable allows capturing the degree of 
RPCs, taking into account the size of the electricity system (in terms of MWh of 
electricity generation), which facilitates cross-country comparisons. 
 
Table 2 summarises the variables selected for this study, the data sources that have been 
used and the sign that can be expected for these variables in the econometric estimation. 
 
Table 2.  Definition of the variables, sources of data and expected sign. 
Variable Definition 
Source of 
data 
Expected 
sign 
Retail electricity prices 
(PE) 
(dependent variable) 
Electricity prices for domestic consumers. Consumption 
band DC:2.500 kWh < Consumption < 5.000kWh 
Electricity prices for industrial consumers. Consumption 
band IC: 500MWh<Consumption<2.000MWh 
Data in €/MWh 
Eurostat 
(dependent 
variable) 
RES-E promotion costs 
(RPC) 
RES-E promotion costs (€/MWh) 
Own 
elaboration 
from 
CEER 
(+) 
Taxes and levies (TL) (€/MWh) Eurostat (+) 
Electricity consumption 
(Econs) 
Final energy consumption-electricity (MWh) Eurostat (-) 
Energy costs (EC) Wholesale Cost and Retail Margin (€/MWh) Eurostat (+) 
Network costs (NC) 
Transmission and distribution tariffs; transmission and 
distribution losses; after-sale services; system service costs 
and meter rental. 
Eurostat (+) 
 
 
The empirical analysis is performed with data for 22 countries, as data on RPCs are not 
available for six EU countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Malta and Slovakia). 
Table 3 provides the summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study.  
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Table 3: Summary of descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
PEh 195 161.6179 48.7811 72.1 297.5 
Pei 195 128.0292 38.5337 62.6 273.2 
RPC 154 14.3552 10.6299 0.49 55.2 
NCh 174 51.3189 15.7600 21.8 96.6 
NCi 180 28.9511 10.8257 3.5 72.4 
TLh 174 41.1925 32.8072 3.4 168.6 
TLi 176 7.8340 10.1725 0 59.9 
ECh 174 70.3523 29.6837 25.9 204 
ECi 180 68.575 27.8792 26.9 201.2 
Econs 196 100,200,081 134,925,959 1,608,000 532,424,000 
 
 
The evolution of the dependent variable (retail electricity prices for both residential and 
industrial consumers) and the promotion costs (in €/MWh) are shown in Figure 1. Retail 
electricity prices for households have been well above those for industry, and diverged 
during the period. This figure helps us to understand the evolution of the dependent variable, 
which is useful for econometric purposes. A lineal trend is identified for both the residential 
and industrial prices and, thus, this trend is included in our model as an additional regressor 
(Tt) to capture this effect. Besides, the figure shows that the retail prices are orders of 
magnitude higher the RPCs. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the retail price for household and industrial consumers and RPCs for the EU 
(€/MWh). 
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The correlation matrix provides relevant information on the relation between the variables 
included in our model (Table 4). This correlation matrix suggests that we can  reject the 
presence of multicollinearity which could arise if there was a high correlation between the 
explanatory variables. The variance inflation factors in OLS (without fixed effects) have 
been calculated and the results confirm that a problem of extreme correlation between the 
explanatory variables does not exist. 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, in order to improve our knowledge on the dependent variable, we plotted both 
domestic and industrial retail prices in a time-series graph for each of the countries (see 
Figures 2and 3). A potential lineal trend on both prices can be identified for most 
countries. Therefore, we include a lineal trend in our model as an additional regressor 
(Tt) to capture this effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PEh PEi ECh NCh TLh ECi NCi TLi Econs RPC 
PEh 1.0000          
PEi 0.7719 1.0000         
ECh 0.5371 0.3869 1.0000        
NCh 0.5371 0.2735 0.0341 1.0000       
TLh 0.8544 0.7342 0.1169 0.3278 1.0000      
ECi 0.3128 0.3745 0.7839 0.0562 -0.0741 1.0000     
NCi -0.0792 0.2138 -0.3492 0.2518 0.0036 -0.3289 1.0000    
TLi 0.5413 0.5348 0.4526 0.0082 0.4769 0.3606 -0.2632 1.0000   
Econs 0.4317 0.2514 0.5349 0.0319 0.2605 0.3371 -0.2347 0.4938 1.0000 
 
RPC 0.3098 0.2859 0.2356 0.1545 0.2275 0.3245 -0.0767 0.5263 0.2671 1.0000 
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Figure 2: Retail price for household consumers (in logs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Retail price for industrial consumers (in logs) 
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4. Results of the estimations. 
 
Table 5 provides the results of the panel GMM estimations of equation 2. The results for 
the average effects of the regulatory and control variables for the household- column (1) 
- and industrial - column (2) - retail prices are statistically significant and in line with 
expectations.  
Our attention will be focused on the results of the influence of RPCs on the retail 
electricity prices. Since we are using panel data, there is causality going from RPCs and 
the rest of explanatory variables to retail prices (dependent variable). 
 
Table 5. Results of model estimations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EC 0.404*** 0.589*** 0.400*** 0.587*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0108) (0.0116) (0.0104) 
NC 0.287*** 0.267*** 0.300*** 0.261*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0203) (0.0169) (0.0201) 
TL 0.245*** 0.0549*** 0.243*** 0.0510*** 
 (0.00955) (0.00370) (0.0117) (0.00649) 
RPC 0.00878*** 0.0239*** 0.0281*** 0.115*** 
 (0.00170) (0.00433) (0.00641) (0.00973) 
Econs -0.121*** -0.0934** -0.101** -0.137** 
 (0.0366) (0.0444) (0.0362) (0.0619) 
Trend 0.0101*** 0.0116*** 0.00813*** 0.0115*** 
 (0.00103) (0.00347) (0.00114) (0.00340) 
RP (lag) -0.0837*** -0.0347 -0.0614*** -0.00694 
 (0.0138) (0.0281) (0.0120) (0.0283) 
RPC*Q   -0.0244** -0.104*** 
   (0.00888) (0.0114) 
     
Pseudo R
2
 0.7347 0.8298 0.8171 0.8827 
Observations 100 95 100 95 
Number of id 22 21 22 21 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pseudo R
2
 calculated as 
[∑(𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?)
2 − ∑(?̂?𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡)
2
] ∑(𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?)
2⁄  
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First, on average, the influence of the RPCs on the retail electricity prices faced by both 
industrial and residential consumers is positive and relatively small. The influence 
found is related to the increase in the support costs over time. This is mostly related to 
the two most relevant technologies in this context (wind on-shore and solar PV). An 
increase of 1% in RPCs induces an increase of 0.023% in the industrial retail prices and 
of 0.008% in the residential retail prices. One possible explanation for this different 
influence on the two categories of consumers is that electricity prices are significantly 
higher for households (161€/MWh on average) than for industry (128€/MWh on 
average). Indeed, the weight of the RPCs in the retail electricity prices is lower for 
households (9%) than for industry (11%). The influence of 1€/MWh of increase in 
RPCs would then be lower in the case of households, i.e. a given increase in the RPCs 
would induce a lower (relative) increase in retail prices for households compared to 
industrial consumers. 
Regarding the absolute influence of RPCs on the retail prices, our results show that this 
is non-negligible, although small compared to other regulations and energy-only costs 
(table 6)
1
. One €/MWh of increase in promotion costs induces an increase of 0.213 
€/MWh (short-term) in the retail price for industrial consumers. This increase is much 
lower for household electricity prices (0.10€/MWh), which. is in line with the statement 
above about the different weight of RPCs in the industrial and residential prices. 
Table 6. Short-run effects of an increase of 1€/MWh in the control variables on the retail price (in 
€/MWh). 
 1 €/MWh in Households Industrial 
RPC 0.10 0.21 
NC 0.90 1.18 
EC 0.93 1.11 
TL 0.97 0.91 
 
The estimated coefficients for the control variables are statistically significant, have the 
expected sign, and their magnitudes seem reasonable. Compared to RPCs, network costs 
have a greater relative impact on retail prices, probably because network costs represent 
a much higher share of the electricity bill than RPCs (on average, the weight of the 
                                                          
1
It is possible to compute the change of the retail price in terms of €/MWh from an increase of 1 €/MWh 
in the RPCs using the results on elasticities (% change of the retail price from a 1 % increase of the RPCs) 
and the average values of both variables.    
16
  
network costs in the retail electricity prices is 27% and the weight of the RPCs is 10%)
2
. 
However, in contrast to the case of the RPCs, the elasticities are higher for households 
(0.29%) than for industry (0.26%), which could be related to industries being charged 
less for those network costs than households, as suggested by Grave et al (2015). 
Industrial consumers may face lower network costs than residential consumers for 
several reasons. First, industrial sectors often use connections with higher voltage (i.e., 
with lower charges). Second, the weight of those costs in the retail electricity prices is 
higher for households (32%) than for industrial consumers (23%). Third, according to 
Ramsey's principle of optimal taxation, the optimal tax rate on an activity should be 
inversely proportional to the price-elasticity of that activity. In order to reduce the 
influence on the regulated revenues, energy suppliers possibly charge relatively more 
network costs (NCs) to domestic than to industrial consumers, i.e. costs are charged 
proportionally more to the more price-inelastic consumers. There might also be country-
specific reasons underlying this result. The influence of taxes and levies is also 
considerable (see table 5) and larger than the RPCs. 
Electricity consumption negatively affects those prices. This may seem counterintuitive 
and at odds with economic theory, since a greater demand should induce a higher level 
of prices, ceteris paribus. However, as mentioned in section 3, it should be taken into 
account that this variable captures the size of the market and, thus, the negative sign 
may suggest the existence of a scale effect, i.e., the greater the amount being consumed 
in the economy, the lower the price. Finally, the influence of energy-only costs on the 
retail prices is positive. Obviously, a higher price of fossil fuels or, in general, a higher 
price for the technology which sets the price in the wholesale electricity market would 
lead to higher wholesale prices and, thus, higher retail prices. It should be taken into 
account, however, that this is partially offset by the so-called merit-order effect, which 
is likely to be more relevant with increasing RES-E penetrations. 
An interesting result is that, if the magnitude of the respective elasticities is considered, 
the influence of changes in energy-only costs clearly outweighs the impact of changes 
in taxes and electricity consumption. This can be explained by the key role played by 
those energy-only costs in the retail prices, which is related to their substantial share as 
                                                          
2
 A priori, it could be expected that both components of the electricity bill were interrelated, since a 
greater RES penetration would involve considerable grid reinforcements and extensions. However, the 
correlation between the variables capturing these components is very low. 
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a component of those prices. It is also relevant to acknowledge that the elasticities for 
the energy-only costs are higher for industrial consumers than for households, which 
could be related to the fact that such a share is higher for the former consumers than for 
the later. In contrast, the influence of taxes is higher for households than for industrial 
consumers, since households pay proportionally more taxes than industrial consumers. 
In this context, the impact of RPCs on electricity retail prices is likely to be mediated by 
the type of instrument being implemented and, within the instruments, by the choice of 
design elements. The literature on RES-E support schemes has consistently shown that 
the success of RES-E promotion critically depends on the choice of instruments and 
design elements.   
A particularly relevant distinction is between price-based (FITs and FIPs) and quantity 
based support instruments (quotas with TGC schemes). The latter have been applied in 
six EU countries during the whole period considered in this article (Belgium, Italy, 
Sweden, Poland, Romania and the U.K.), although, in two cases, combined with FITs in 
the last years of the period for some technologies
3
, In the other 16 countries, price-based 
support schemes have been applied, either in isolation or combined with secondary 
instruments. This distinction is relevant in so far as both types of instruments seem to 
have had quite a different impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of RES support 
schemes (Held et al 2014, Ragwitz et al 2007, IEA 2011). The literature shows that, at 
least for wind on-shore and solar PV, FITs have generally been more effective than 
quotas with TGCs4. The level of support being provided with FITs has usually been 
closer to the generation costs of the respective technologies, whereas excessive unitary 
remuneration (€/MWh) has often been the case under TGCs. However, the great solar 
PV deployment under FITs has led to very large total support costs (unitary support 
times the amount of RES-E being generated) in several countries (e.g., Spain and 
Germany). This has also been due to the lack of implementation of cost-containment 
mechanisms under FITs (such as budget generation or capacity caps) in the past. 
                                                          
3 FITs for solar PV have been adopted since 2010 in Italy and since 2009 for small-scale RES (<5 MW) in 
the U.K.   
4
 However, the evidence at the world level is not so conclusive. While Dong (2012) find that FITs are 
more effective than quotas (Carley et al 2016) find that the opposite is true. FITs are found to be an 
effective way to increase RES-E specifically for the case of the USA in Smith and Urpelainen (2014). 
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Therefore, in order to test the influence of support instruments on the relationship 
between support costs and retail prices, another set of regressions on both industrial and 
household retail prices was performed including, in addition, an interaction term 
(RPC*Q) between the RPC variable and a dummy variable (Q) which takes the value 1 
for those countries with a quantity-based scheme in the whole period being considered 
(2007-2013) and 0 otherwise (i.e., implicitly the base level corresponds to countries 
with price-based schemes)
5
. The results in Table 5 –columns (3) and (4) for households 
and industrial consumers, respectively- show that the impact on retail prices has been 
greater in countries with price-based schemes than in countries with quantity-based 
schemes.  The reason for this novel result is probably related to the higher total 
(although not necessarily unitary) costs of RES-E promotion under FITs and other 
price-based promotion mechanisms. 
To sum up, although RPCs have a non-negligible impact on retail prices, this impact is 
relatively small when compared to other factors and is mediated by the type of 
instrument being chosen. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Final consumers’ prices have substantially increased in the EU. From 2007 to 2013 by 
34% for domestic customers and 29% for industrial customers between 2007 and 2013. 
Despite efficiency gains and the progressive opening of energy markets to competition, 
that have reduced wholesale electricity prices, retail prices have increased, and the price 
increase during this period has been strongly influenced by the regulated component. 
This has triggered the concern of policy-makers around Europe. RPCs have been 
singled out as a main driver of such increase. This paper aims to analyse the impact of 
RPCs on the evolution of retail prices in the EU. 
Our results show that renewable energy promotion costs have a non-negligible, positive 
and statistically significant impact on the retail prices faced by both industrial and 
residential consumers. However, such impact is relatively small when compared to 
other variables. Differences between the two types of consumers exist. An increase of 
                                                          
5
In order to identify the instruments implemented between 2007 and 2013 in the 22 Member States, we 
have used several sources: CEER (2008, 2011, 2013, 2015), Held et al (2014), del Río and Mir-Artigues 
(2014) and Mir-Artigues and del Río (2016).  
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1% in RPCs induces an increase of only 0.023% in the industrial retail prices and of 
0.008% in the residential retail price. Furthermore, differences between instruments 
exist, with price-based RES support schemes having a greater impact on retail prices 
than quantity-based ones, which is related to the absence of cost-containment 
mechanisms in the former (i.e., budget, generation or capacity caps), despite the 
generally higher unitary support costs for quantity-based schemes. 
These results have clear public policy implications. First, they suggest that the focus on 
RPCs as a main driver of retail prices should be put into context and that measures to 
control the increase in those prices should take into account those other drivers. The fact 
that the impact is small in the period considered in this paper does not imply that the 
increase in RPCs and their impact on electricity prices should not be a concern for 
policy-makers. In fact, although this impact has been small in the period considered, it 
is likely to be much higher with growing RES shares. Measures should be adopted in 
order to limit the increase in retail prices which negatively affects household consumers 
(aggravating the energy poverty problem) and the competitiveness of industries. 
Second, our findings suggest that the choice of design elements and particularly cost-
containment instruments are a must in order to limit the costs of the RPCs in price-
based schemes. Quantity-based support schemes (quotas with TGCs) have an in-built 
mechanism to contain those costs by capping the amount of generation which can be 
remunerated (given by the quota), although TGCs have other problems (including high 
remuneration levels for the most mature technologies and best sites, relatively high 
revenue risks negatively affecting capital costs and ineffectiveness in promoting still 
maturing technologies, see Mir-Artigues and del Río 2016, Noothout et al 2016). Price 
caps (in the form of penalties) represent an effective way to mitigate the risks of very 
high TGC prices. In price-based support schemes, such as administratively set feed-in 
tariffs and feed-in premiums, which do not have such in-built cost-containment 
mechanism, there are several alternatives to limit the costs, including budget, generation 
or capacity caps, traditional degression and growth corridors. These cost-containment 
measures have recently been adopted (del Río and Mir-Artigues 2014). Auctions are 
increasingly being used for RES-E support, taking into account the D.G. COMP 
Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy for 2014-2020 (which 
strongly encourage the use of this mechanism EU-wide from January 1
st
 2017) and the 
concern of governments on the cost-effectiveness of support (AURES project 2016). 
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Avoiding the sky-rocketing of those costs is required for the social acceptability and, 
thus, political feasibility of RES-E support schemes in the future. 
Third, the fact that the burden falls to a greater extent on the industrial sectors suggests 
that limiting the cost pass-through into retail prices for these consumers could be 
justifiable, i.e., the increase in RPCs should not be passed completely to the retail 
electricity prices paid by industrial firms. However, this is a difficult decision with 
negative implications for other actors
6
 
Several limitations of the study suggest fruitful avenues for future research: 
First, the temporal and geographical scope of the analysis could be widened to non-EU 
countries and a more recent period. Broadening the period of the analysis could show 
whether the aforementioned cost-containment measures, recently implemented EU-
wide, have had a mitigating impact of RPCs on retail electricity prices and the degree of 
such effects. Data are not yet available to perform such analysis, however. 
Second, the analysis in this paper has not distinguished between different types of 
technologies. The impact of the deploymet of different renewable energy technologies 
(solar PV, wind, biomass and hydro) on the RPCs should be further analysed. 
Third, the interrelation between RPCs and other drivers should also be considered. This 
paper has implicitly assumed that they are separated from each other. Indeed, from the 
statistical point of view, at a country aggregated level, the data do not reflect this 
interaction. However, they may increasingly be related with a growing RES penetration. 
For example, RPCs and NCs may be increasingly interrelated with a growing 
penetration of RES, since much higher RES deployment rates entail considerable grid 
reinforcements and extensions
7
. Further research could be devoted to the analysis of 
these interrelationships. 
Finally, this paper has analysed the influence of two broad categories of RES-E support 
instruments (price-based vs. quantity-based) on the retail prices. Further research could 
                                                          
6 Obviously, someone would have to pay for those added costs. Two alternatives exist in this regard: 
households or the public budget. Adding this to the retail electricity price paid by households would be 
particularly detrimental for the most vulnerable consumers. Of course, the public deficit would be 
increased in the other option. 
7
Indeed, the market integration of an increasing amount of RES is becoming a growing source of concern 
for policy-makers, probably on an equal footing with the increase in RPCs (REN21 2015). 
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be dedicated to the analysis of the impact of a more disaggregated set of instruments as 
well as different design elements for those instruments. 
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Annex I. Review of the literature on the influence of different components of retail 
electricity prices. 
Reference 
Scope 
 (geography 
–time) 
Method 
Relevant details and results 
Morey and Kirsch 
(2014) 
 
Germany, 
1998-2013 
Decriptive 
methodology 
The authors suggest that Germany’s enthusiastic embrace 
of RES may be adding 10 times as much to the German 
residential rates as experienced in the United States. The 
impact of RES-E support (EEG) has been increasing in 
both absolute and relative terms. It will cost electricity 
consumers about $38.5 billion, compared to projected 
revenues from the sale of RES-E in the wholesale spot 
market of about $3.4 billion. The subsidy flowing from 
consumers to RES-E in 2013 is thus about $35 billion.  
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Cludius et al 
(2014) 
Australia, 
2011-2012 
and 2012-
2013 
Time-series 
analysis of 
historical price 
and load data 
(Tobit model). 
Besides a wholesale component and renewable energy 
scheme charges, residential retail prices also include 
charges for transmission and distribution networks. These 
network costs are, indeed, the major cost component. In 
2012-13 residential retail prices in the Australian National 
Electricity Market comprised estimated cost components 
for transmission networks of 8% and distribution networks 
of 37%, a wholesale component including carbon costs of 
37% and a retail component of 17% that included an 
allowance for LRET and SRES costs of 3–4%. 
Some energy-intensive industries are benefiting from 
lower wholesale electricity prices (due to increasing wind 
generation) whilst being largely exempted from 
contributing to the costs of the wind support scheme. By 
contrast, many households are paying significant 
renewable energy pass-through costs whilst not 
necessarily benefiting from lower wholesale prices. 
Simshauser, P., 
Nelson, T. (2013).  
Australia, 
2009-2013 
Descriptive 
methodology 
and simulation 
models 
(NEMESYS, 
partial-
equilibrium 
electricity 
model) 
The paper analyses the factors behind the increase in retail 
prices in the 2009-2013 period and possible scenarios for 
2020. It is based on a descriptive methodology for the past 
and simulation models for the future. The authors simulate 
an increase in the Mandated Renewable Energy Target 
(MRET) policy by a factor of four, thus taking renewable 
from 4 percent to 16 percent in the fuel mix by 2015. 
Increased use of renewables leads to unit prices rising to 
US$61.20/MWh, about US$3.20/MWh higher than in a 
reference scenario.  
Flaherty et al 
(2014) 
Ireland, 
2007-2013 
Description of 
historical data 
from the market 
and grid 
operators. 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of wind 
energy penetration on both the wholesale and retail 
prices of electricity in Ireland. An analysis of the data 
reveals that increasing wind penetration is having little impact 
on average prices. In contrast, gas prices gas are the main 
determinant of SMP. 
Moreno et al 
(2012). 
 
EU, 1998-
2009 
Econometric 
panel data model 
(fixed effects). 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the 
electricity prices determinants. It develops econometric 
panel models to explore the relationship between the 
household electricity prices and variables related to RES 
and the competition in generation electricity market. The 
results suggest that electricity prices increase with the 
deployment of RES (wind). Regarding electricity 
generated from wind, the estimated coefficient suggests 
that a 1% increase in this variable leads to an increase of 
0.031% in household electricity prices. Results also reveal 
that the country's characteristics can affect household 
electricity prices. Dependent variable: Electricity prices 
for household consumers. Explanatory variables: Market 
share of the largest generator in the electricity market, 
RES-E penetration, GDP per capita, GHG emissions by 
energy industries as a total of GHG emissions and energy 
dependency (ED). All variables are statistically 
significant. 
DECC (2013). U.K. 2012. 
Forecasts to 
2020 and 
2030 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Wholesale energy costs are estimated to currently make up 
around 37% of an average household electricity bill 
(excluding the cost of carbon). In 2013, energy and 
climate change policies are estimated to represent 14% of 
an average household electricity bill. Transmission, 
distribution and metering costs (20%), other supplier costs 
and margins (19%) and VAT (5%) are the other main 
components of the average household energy bill. Policies 
are estimated to currently be adding around 17% to the 
average electricity price paid by UK households. In 
addition to the cost of the ECO and Warm Home 
Discount, this also reflects the cost of the RO and small-
scale Feed-in-Tariffs (FITs) obligation on retail prices.  
IPART (2012) New South 
Wales 
(NSW) 
Descriptve 
sttistics 
Over the past years 2010-2011 years, the main reasons for 
the increases in average regulated electricity prices were 
rising network costs and rising green scheme costs (the 
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(Australia) 
2012-2013 
costs of complying with Commonwealth and State 
Government schemes aimed at mitigating growth in 
carbon emissions, including the Renewable Energy Target 
scheme). In 2012,, the increases are primarily driven by 
the continuing rise in network costs, which is responsible 
for nearly half of the average 18% price increase. The 
introduction of a carbon pricing mechanism, which is 
responsible for the other half. Increase in RES-E support 
only accounts for a 0.3% price increase. RPCs represent 
between 5 and a 7% of a household electricity bill (vs. 
43%-56% for network costs and 21%-29% for energy-
only costs).  
London Economics 
(2012). 
The EU-15 
and Selected 
OECD 
jurisdictions. 
1984-2010 
Econometric 
model 
This study assesses the trends and position of the UK 
electricity and gas retail markets relative to comparable 
jurisdictions in terms of prices, competition and 
profitability.  
The econometric analysis suggests that commodity input 
prices, fuel mix (electricity), the need to import (gas) and 
wages explain a large amount of the variation in retail 
prices for both residential and industrial customers across 
jurisdictions and over time. 
Impact of each explanatory variable across the regressions 
(for electricity prices): commodity input prices (+), energy 
usage per capita (-), wage levels as proxy for input costs 
(+), proportion of hydro (-), proportion of nuclear (-), 
proportion of renewable (+). 
Fischer (2010)  U.S. 2008 General model 
of energy supply 
and demand 
The authors analyse the impact of renewable portfolio 
standards (RPS) on retail electricity prices. Over an initial 
range—from the current 3 percent to about 7.5 percent—
the RPS does slightly lower the retail price relative to the 
baseline. However, more ambitious standards raise retail 
prices, and increasingly so as we enter the 10 to 20 percent 
range of many policy targets. The two driving factors are 
the elasticity of electricity supply from renewable energy 
sources relative to nonrenewable ones and the effective 
stringency of the target. The availability of other baseload 
generation helps to determine that stringency, and demand 
elasticity influences only the magnitude of the price 
effects, not the direction of those effects. Sensitivity 
analysis indicates that assumptions about renewable 
energy supply slopes are more important than those about 
nonrenewable supplies in predicting the retail price 
impacts of renewable portfolio standards.  
Deane et al (2014). U.K. and 
Ireland 
2008-2011 
Electricity 
market model 
This paper investigates the price of electricity in Ireland 
and Great Britain. Both wholesale and retail prices during 
the 2008-2011 period are compared and structural, 
technological and regulatory characteristics are suggested 
which explain the price differences. In Great Britain, a 
TGC scheme has been adopted, whereas FITs are applied 
in Ireland. The authors argue that RES-E support in Great 
Britain appears very expensive when compared to Ireland 
(even though the penetration of RES-E is about half that 
of Ireland). 
Traber, T. And 
Kemfert (2009).  
Germany 
2006 
 Electricity 
market model 
with 
oligopolistic 
behaviour 
(EMELIEEEUR-
25) 
It investigates the effects of the German FIT, 
analysing the impacts on producer and consumer 
prices, electricity sector emissions, price-cost 
margins and on the firm’s profits from plant 
operation. To highlight the transmission channels, 
they decompose the effects of the FIT into a 
substitution effect, triggered by the replacement of 
conventional by renewable sources, and a permit 
price effect induced via the ETS. They find that the 
total effect of the policy increases the German 
consumer price slightly by 3%, while the producer 
price decreases by 8%. The FIT increases, the price-
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cost margins of almost all dominant firms, indicating 
a market power enhancing effect under their 
baseline assumption of oligopolistic competition. 
They do not find evidence of the theoretically 
possible decrease in consumer prices due to RES 
support. Rather, they show that a pronounced 
increase of consumer prices by the FIT can be 
expected since it induces an increase in price-cost 
margins of suppliers of conventional electricity.  
Bloomenergy 
(2010).  
 
California 
2009-2020 
Description of 
possible 
 
 trends and 
drivers based on 
multiple 
information 
sources. 
In this paper recent trends and forecasts for average retail 
and commercial electricity prices in California are 
explored. More importantly, they discuss the main drivers 
for future increases including: 
• Infrastructure investment 
• Fuel costs 
• Climate change legislation (mainly RES-E support 
costs). 
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